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Abstract 
Grading schemes are an increasingly common method of quality disclosure for public 
services. Restaurant grading makes information about food safety practices more readily 
available and may reduce the prevalence of foodborne illnesses. However, it may also have 
meaningful financial repercussions. Using fine-grained administrative data that tracks food safety 
compliance and sales activity for the universe of graded restaurants in New York City and its 
bordering counties, we assess the aggregate financial effects from restaurant grading. Results 
indicate that the grading policy, after an initial period of adjustment, improves restaurants’ food 
safety compliance and reduces fines. While the average effect on revenues for graded 
restaurants across the municipality is null, the graded restaurants located geographically closer 
to an ungraded regime experience slower growth in revenues. There is also evidence of revenue 
convergence across graded and ungraded restaurants in the long-term.   
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I.  Introduction 
 Grading schemes have become a popular way to accessibly and concisely convey the 
quality of public services. They are a good example of an information-based policy, which aims 
to influence, or “nudge” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009), the user’s behavior in a particular direction 
rather than mandating or directly incentivizing it. Municipalities across the U.S. grade the 
performance of public schools, street cleanliness is frequently scored and graded, and the 
Straphangers Campaign in New York City even produces a “report card” ranking the performance 
of each subway train line. One of the more recent grading initiatives applies to restaurants’ food 
safety compliance, a policy that has taken hold in cities across the globe (Filion and Powell 2009). 
The underlying intuition is clear: the grades succinctly and conspicuously summarize information 
on sanitary conditions, by an independent third-party regulator, empowering restaurant goers to 
choose safer restaurants, reducing the exposure to foodborne illnesses. However, its reception 
has not been uniformly positive: restaurant owners, in particular, have pushed back forcefully 
against the policy. Their main concern is over the potential impact on their bottom line. Does it 
increase compliance-related costs?  Does it help or harm restaurants’ sales?  And, more broadly, 
what are the financial implications for the municipality?  In this paper, we shed light on all of 
these questions for the largest municipality with a restaurant-grading regime in the U.S. and 
present the first estimates of such a policy’s aggregate financial impacts. 
 We use fine-grained administrative data that tracks the food safety compliance and sales 
activity for the universe of restaurants in New York City (NYC) and its bordering counties, over 
multiple years, to assess the broader financial consequences of the restaurant grading policy in 
NYC. Results indicate that NYC’s grading policy affected both restaurant sanitary conditions and 
 
2 
 
fines levied. While there appears to be a short period of adjustment, during which trends from 
the pre-policy period continue, both initial and final inspection scores (which reflect the number 
and severity of food safety violations) eventually decline following the implementation of public 
grading. More specifically, initial inspection scores increase by about 2.5 points (about 10% of 
the pre-grading mean) upon policy implementation, but then decline at about 1.5 points per 
quarter thereafter. Further, fines increase immediately after the start of the grading policy (by 
between $65 and $100 per inspection, or about 6% - 10% of the mean fine before grading), but 
decline thereafter such that any gain is reversed by the second quarter post-implementation (and 
further reduced each quarter after that). 
 The impacts on sales revenues, however, are less stark. While simple pre-post analyses of 
restaurants in New York City indicate positive revenue effects immediately after the policy’s 
implementation, this effect reverses when we add control groups of ungraded food and 
entertainment establishments. However, when we allow the post-grading effect to vary non-
linearly over time, and account for a long-term convergence of revenues across graded and 
ungraded establishments, the initial suppression of revenues for NYC restaurants subject to a 
grading regime attenuates. While the difference in revenues is insignificant in the full sample, it 
remains highly significant when we narrow in on the part of NYC that borders the suburban 
counties without any grading regime. These results suggest that while the average effect on 
revenues across the municipality is null, the graded restaurants located geographically closer to 
an ungraded regime see smaller increases in revenues. 
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II. Public Restaurant Grading and Quality Disclosure 
 There is an established history of government either mandating quality disclosure or 
conducting its own inspections, especially when the health or safety of consumers is at issue. 
While restaurants have long been inspected and monitored by the government, the results of 
those inspections, while publicly available, have not always been readily accessible. The obscurity 
of that information creates information asymmetries, whereby the restaurant operator knows 
the sanitation conditions inside the establishment and the consumer knows only what is easily 
visible on site at the restaurant. Consumers can also be informed by a business’ reputation or 
personal experiences related to the establishment’s food safety. These sources are also 
imperfect, however, as it is difficult for the consumer to link ex post health symptoms with the 
restaurant’s product, especially if the restaurant is infrequently patronized (Dranove and Jin 
2010). Without explicit quality disclosure, consumers make decisions about their eating habits 
based on incomplete information and the restaurants have fewer incentives to change behaviors 
around less discernible sanitation issues. Theory suggests, then, that consumers should be 
affected by excess incidents of foodborne illness. Public grading policies aim to address these 
information asymmetries (and the subsequent health risks) by making the sanitation inspection 
information more readily available to the consumer, in a way that minimizes his/her search costs. 
Specifically, the letter grading presents a format that is systematic, easily understood and 
comparable, and with a clear ranking or “mapping” of grades onto food-safety ratings (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009; Dranove and Jin 2010). The fact that the rating is mandatory and imposed by 
the government, a seemingly objective third-party, also makes the information seem more 
consistent and trustworthy than were it to come from the restaurant itself or even a private 
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rating company with either monetary or reputational incentives (Dranove and Jin 2010). In 
addition, the posting of the letter grade in plain sight, at the point of purchase, makes the 
information particularly salient and minimizes the effort required to gather and process it (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009). 
 We consider the implications of grading policies on restaurants’ aggregate financial 
outcomes, which we understand to be a product of a series of micro-decisions on the part of 
consumers. We make the reasonable assumption (supported by conversations with professionals 
and officials involved in the grading regime) that in the case of NYC restaurant operating costs 
changed in negligible ways; therefore, any response in revenues should capture shifts in 
consumer behavior.1  Here, we discuss how, depending on the nature of these micro-decisions, 
the aggregate financial effects are theoretically ambiguous. In the most optimistic scenario, the 
posting of grades will do two things. First, it will influence existing restaurant consumers to sort 
away from the establishments with lower grades and towards those with higher grades. Second, 
it will also induce consumers, who did not patronize restaurants before (or at least not as 
frequently), to dine out (presumably more so at the establishments with higher grades). The 
restaurants will, in turn, adjust sanitary practices to improve compliance and earn higher grades, 
either in response to or in expectation of a change in consumer behavior. This suggests that food 
safety compliance will improve and sales will increase for the average restaurant. 
                                                          
1 DOHMH claims that the types of actions that lead to violations most frequently are based on 
habits and training, and not those requiring capital repairs. They suggested that we were unlikely 
to see impacts on capital investments because those were not the type of violations that were 
most frequent. 
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 We consider this first scenario an optimistic, or upper bound, condition, as the grading 
policy’s impact could be dampened in two important ways. First, it could be that no or few new 
consumers enter the restaurant market and the grading may simply trigger a re-sorting of existing 
restaurant patrons. In that case, food safety compliance may still improve over time, but sales 
would, on average, exhibit no or little change, as spending is reallocated from restaurants with 
lower grades to those with higher grades. Second, expected outcomes may be minimized if the 
new information provided by the posted grades does not alter preconceptions about food safety. 
In this case, loyal patrons may prioritize information gathered from their first-hand experiences 
with the restaurant over the posted grade and continue their patronage in the same manner as 
before. For similar reasons, a restaurant’s broader reputation could lessen the effect of the 
information provided by the posted grade (Dranove and Jin 2010; Jin and Leslie 2009). Captive 
patrons, such as those without any other dining options nearby, may also not process the posted 
grade in the same way. Under these conditions, changes in both food safety compliance and 
revenues could be attenuated: the restaurants may be less motivated to invest in improving the 
posted grade so that any grade-induced sorting would be less evident in sales activity.  
III. Background  
A. New York City’s Restaurant Grading Policy 
 The NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) has long inspected the 
City’s restaurants to ensure proper food safety practices, fining restaurants for violations and 
closing restaurants with public health hazards. In the early 2000’s, they introduced a website 
where anyone could view the restaurants’ violations. The letter grading policy, which began July 
2010, followed the same inspection criteria and scoring system, but started assigning each 
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restaurant a letter grade (A, B, or C) and required restaurants to post the grades near the 
restaurant's entrance. These letters are printed in large bold font and are required to be near 
eye-level and at the front entrance—passersby can easily discern them, even from across the 
street (a sample of a posted grade is shown in Appendix A). DOHMH also added the grades for 
each inspection to its website. The stated goal of the public grading law was to improve 
restaurant sanitary practices and decrease the incidence of restaurant-attributable foodborne 
illness in NYC. 
 Inspection scores are calculated as the sum of violation points assigned during 
inspections. The points for a particular violation depend on the health risk it poses to the public, 
and the level of public health risk falls into three categories: public health hazards, critical 
violations and general violations. Additional points are added to each violation to reflect the 
severity of the violation.2 Points from violations are then aggregated to generate the final 
inspection score, with lower scores reflecting more hygienic conditions. The scoring rubric used 
after the policy change is exactly the same as that used prior to 2010. Following the policy change, 
however, DOHMH translated inspection scores into letter grades as follows: an inspection score 
of 13 or below is assigned a grade of A; a score between 14-27 a B; and a score of 28 or higher 
are assigned a C.3 That said, if an initial inspection yields a score in the B or C grade range, the 
grade is not viewed as final. Instead, the restaurant is inspected again within one month. Thus, a 
final grade is assigned either after a re-inspection (for those with initial inspection scores above 
                                                          
2 See NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (2010) for detailed explanation of the 
relationship between violation severity and violation points assessed and 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doh/downloads/pdf/rii/blue-book.pdf  and Schwartz et a. 2015 
for more detail on how DOHMH translates scores into grades. 
3 Restaurants can also be temporarily closed if they pose a large public safety risk. 
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13) or at the initial inspection if an A is earned. In addition to determining the publicly posted 
grade, the inspection outcome affects the time to the next inspection visit. A restaurants are 
visited annually for food safety inspections; B’s are inspected twice a year; and C’s are inspected 
three times a year. These inspection visits are unannounced within these known longer intervals. 
 Restaurants are also given the right to due process. They may challenge their violations 
(and, therefore, inspection scores, fines, and grades) at a tribunal administered by an 
independent agency, the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH). Cases regarding 
violations received during the inspection process are adjudicated by hearing examiners (acting 
as judges), typically lawyers hired by OATH. Silver et. al. (2017) find that restaurants earning B 
and C grades at inspection are much more likely to have inspection scores reduced (improved) 
through the adjudication process in the post-period than they were in the pre-period, resulting 
in substantially better grades (Silver, et. al. 2017). These findings suggest that challenging grades 
in court is an important tool for restaurants motivated to post A grades in their window. 
Restaurants DO have the right to post a placard that reads "Grade Pending" in lieu of posting B 
or C grades until they have their case heard at the OATH tribunal; this practice may reduce 
consumer certainty about restaurant food safety compliance. 
 Throughout the study period (both before and after the implementation of restaurant 
grading), the type and count of inspection violations determines fines assessed. Fines range from 
$200-$2,000 per violation and are assessed at a restaurant's adjudication hearing at the 
discretion of a hearing officer.4 It is important to note that after January 18, 2011, restaurants 
                                                          
4 An exception to this is if the grade is accepted and a lower fine is paid by the restaurant 
operator. 
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receiving an A grade at inspection were not fined for any inspection violations; therefore A 
restaurants do not incur any fines for much of the period following the introduction of the grading 
policy. 
B. Empirical Literature Review 
 Grading, as a means of conveying information about the quality of services or goods, is 
used in other policy contexts, including public education and health care.5  Impact studies of 
public grading largely focus on the effects of the grades themselves and how differentiated 
information affects relevant outcomes. In the case of ranking health plans, most studies find that 
higher-ranked plans see increases in their market share, but that the ratings have less of an effect 
when they are hard to understand or when they do not provide new information to the consumer 
(for example, Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002 and Dafny and Dranove 2008). In the case of education, 
many districts grade schools on their effectiveness (e.g., improvements in test scores) and make 
these grades publicly available. There is some evidence that schools with lower grades have 
short-term improvement in aggregate student achievements (Rockoff and Turner, 2010; Winters 
and Cowen, 2012) and that the information provided by school grades affects housing prices 
above and beyond information provided by test scores (Figlio and Lucas, 2004). In addition, 
Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that parents use mandated information on school quality to 
move their children to higher performing schools. 
 The empirical research on food quality disclosure, and grading in particular, is scarce. 
While the mechanisms of disclosure might be similar to other contexts, one could argue that the 
                                                          
5 For a comprehensive review of the literature on quality disclosure see Dranove and Jin 2010. 
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magnitude and transient nature of the decision is at a different scale than that related to health 
care plans or schools (Ippolito and Mathios 1990). There is a set of studies that assess the impact 
of food content disclosure on consumer behavior; these studies find that consumers do 
increasingly opt for the “healthier” option when the disclosure of relevant information becomes 
mandatory (Ippolito and Mathios 1990; Mathios 2000). These are not instances, however, of a 
standardized grading regime; restaurant grading provides such a scenario. Ho (2012) analyzes 
publicly available restaurant grading data for NYC, exploring the extent to which inspection 
scores in one period predict future scores: he observes that prior scores predict less than 2% of 
future grades. Wong et al. (2015) provide new evidence of improved compliance since the 
beginning of NYC’s public grading program, and offers survey evidence of the program’s high 
approval ratings among New Yorkers. This is consistent with other surveys that have 
demonstrated that consumers use public inspection results to inform their dining decisions 
(Filion and Powell 2009). 
 As for impact studies of restaurant grading regimes, there are three.6  Two studies (Jin 
and Leslie, 2003; Simon et al., 2005) focus on the effects of the Los Angeles health inspection 
letter grade system, which started requiring posted letter grades in 1998. Jin and Leslie (2003) 
                                                          
6 We do not focus on the incidence of foodborne illness as an outcome of interest. While 
important it is extremely difficult to link it to the prevalence and use of posted inspection 
grades. Indeed, the correlation between inspection scores and foodborne disease outbreaks is 
inconsistent (Filion and Powell 2009) and empirically hard to identify. It relies entirely on 
restaurant patrons correctly identifying the foodborne illness and attributing its source, which 
is difficult to do for a number of reasons (duration of latency, expectations about food safety, 
proclivities towards gastrointestinal symptoms) (Jones and Angulo 2006; Mead et. al. 1999; Fein 
et. al. 1995;); moreover, it relies on their reporting the illness, which we know is done 
inconsistently (Jones and Angulo 2006 Mead et. al. 1999). For all of these reasons, we focus 
instead on food safety compliance and economic impacts (for both the restaurants and 
municipal finances). 
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use OLS and difference-in-differences regression analyses to estimate the effect of the Los 
Angeles letter grades program on inspection scores, restaurant revenues, and foodborne illness 
hospitalizations. They find that posted grades improve restaurant inspection scores, that 
restaurant revenues respond to hygiene quality signals (i.e. better grades), and that foodborne-
disease hospitalizations decrease in Los Angeles County following the implementation of the 
public letter grade program. The study by Simon et. al. (2005) also provides evidence of reduced 
hospitalizations due to foodborne illnesses in Los Angeles County, compared to California overall. 
Jin and Leslie also suggest that the improvements in health outcomes cannot be explained by 
consumption choices alone, but are also likely a result of restaurant hygiene improvements. The 
most recent study, by Schwartz et. al. (2015), focuses on the impact of individual grades on 
restaurant food inspection compliance and economic activity and finds that a better grade 
increases a restaurant’s sales (and associated sales taxes) and decreases the amount of fines 
assessed and the probability of the restaurant’s closure. These results are also consistent with 
the expectation that public restaurant grading provides new information for consumers’ dining 
decisions. 
IV. Data and Measures 
 Our analytical approach is multi-pronged. We employ several metrics to capture the 
grading program’s effect, two different data sets, and alternative identification strategies to 
exploit, where possible, more detailed data on the NYC grading program. For NYC only, we use 
detailed information on restaurants, including their food-safety compliance (e.g., inspection 
scores, posted grades) and sales revenues. These data were pulled in two different ways: for NYC 
restaurants only, and again for a larger sample including information on restaurant and other 
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ungraded food and entertainment establishments for NYC and two additional suburban counties 
for comparison. 
A. NYC Restaurant Grading and Compliance Data 
 We use data on the restaurant-grading program from the NYC Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), the city agency tasked with administering and monitoring food safety 
compliance. These data include restaurant characteristics, zip codes, inspection dates and scores, 
adjudication dates, grades assigned, and fines assessed. Restaurant characteristics include 
number of seats, number of employees, an indicator for chain restaurant (at least 15 locations 
nationwide), and a series of variables indicating cuisine offered, service type, and venue type.7 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the restaurants in our NYC sample. The mean restaurant 
has 3.25 final inspections over the study period, employs 6.2 workers and has about 29.6 seats. 
Just under 11% of restaurants in the sample are chains. 
 We use scores assessed at each initial and final inspection to capture food safety 
compliance. Importantly, both initial and re-inspections take place without advanced notice and 
inspectors are randomly assigned to their visits (and do not come back to the same site for re-
inspections). Initial scores will reflect the unanticipated response on the part of the restaurants 
and the final inspection scores will, to some extent, reflect learning or adjustment by restaurants. 
This difference is confirmed in the data (and displayed in Figure 1), where we see a starker shift 
in final inspection scores (compared to pre-grading scores) towards lower values; the distribution 
                                                          
7 A full list of cuisine, service, and venue types is available upon request. We use data on 
restaurant characteristics recorded at the last inspection only, so these characteristics do not 
vary with time. Unfortunately, we cannot access information on restaurant characteristics over 
time, as they are not tracked by DOHMH. 
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of initial scores is not identical, but certainly more similar, before and after the implementation 
of grading.8 
 Finally, we use data on fines to assess the program’s public revenue generation (and 
conversely, the financial burden on restaurants) – focusing on fines levied. All dollar values are 
adjusted using urban CPI to real 2013 dollars. 
 The NYC grading and compliance data span December 1, 2007 through February 28, 2013, 
two and a half years before and after the implementation of public grading (hereafter referred 
to as "pre-period" and "post-period", respectively). This sample includes 159,588 initial 
inspections and 167,045 final inspections of 41,362 restaurants in all, including 29,864 
restaurants operating and graded in the post-period. 
B. Sales Revenue and Tax Data 
New York City Sample 
 We obtain reported quarterly sales for all NYC restaurants from the city’s Department of 
Finance (NYC DOF).9  Due to statutory restrictions on data sharing, we could not access filer-level 
information. Instead, NYC DOF aggregated the data in order to ensure the confidentiality of the 
                                                          
8 This finding, in addition to the fact that inspectors are randomly assigned to restaurants and 
do not conduct repeat visits, will help to mitigate against concerns that inspectors are 
systematically inflating scores post-grading to achieve higher grades. For a more 
comprehensive discussion of this issue in the case of the NYC grading regime, please see 
Schwartz et al. 2015. 
9 These values are also adjusted to 2013 dollars. NYC restaurants are required to collect sales 
tax on food and beverage sales at a rate of 8.875% of gross sales - 4.875% for New York State 
and 4.0% for NYC. The State collects the entire sales tax from restaurants and remits the City’s 
portion of sales tax revenue in the following month. Restaurants with $300,000 or less of sales 
in the previous quarter may remit sales taxes to New York State quarterly, while restaurants 
with more than $300,000 of sales in the previous quarter remit monthly to the State. 
 
13 
 
restaurants according to the following protocol: (i) matching DOHMH restaurant data and NYC 
DOF sales data using Employer Identification Numbers (EINs), and (ii) aggregating the EIN-level 
sales reports into randomly-assigned groups, to create a group-level data set.10 In the resulting 
group-level data set, each observation contains summary data for the set of 10 restaurants 
randomly assigned to the same group, or “bin”, for each quarter-year in the pre-grading and post-
grading periods.11  The data set is a panel of restaurant-groups, each of which can be followed 
throughout the study period. The random assignment of the restaurants into the groups 
mitigates any bias caused either by geographic clustering of grades or subsequent spillover 
effects. The summary statistics for each group-quarter include means and standard deviations of 
sales. Our sample for the NYC sales analyses includes 2,288 groups and 24,464 observations.12 
New York City, Long Island and Westchester Sample 
 We construct a control group of establishments, using sales data from the two counties 
bordering NYC (Nassau and Westchester) that were never subject to a grading policy during the 
study period. Since we required data outside of NYC’s jurisdiction, we needed to coordinate with 
                                                          
10 To address attrition and entry, we stratify the sample by quarters of operation and then 
assign restaurants to groups of ten within each strata. Thus, the 5,145 restaurants operating in 
all 20 quarters of our study period were randomly assigned to 509 groups of 10 and five groups 
of 11; the 149 restaurants operating in all but the last quarter were grouped in five groups of 10 
and 9 groups of 11; the 244 operating in all but the first were grouped in 20 groups of 10 and 4 
groups of 11. They continue this process, sequentially, until all restaurants are assigned to 
groups, homogeneous in their quarters of operation and no group (and no observation) ever 
provides information on fewer than ten establishments. 
11 A small number of groups have 11 rather than 10 restaurants in order to make sure all 
restaurants are included. 
12 The policy is implemented in the middle of the 2nd sales tax quarter in 2011. Our NYC analytic 
sample includes data observed from the 4th quarter of 2008 to the 3rd quarter of 2013. 
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the State’s Department of Taxation and Finance (NYS DOF).13  This involved a separate data 
request, with slightly different grouping parameters (we were subject to the same confidentiality 
requirements and had to, again, group the tax filer data into bins of 10). First, we distinguish the 
types of food establishments that would be subject to grading from those that earn commercial 
revenues (such as grocery stores or entertainment venues) but are never subject to a grading 
regime. Unlike the NYC data, we were unable to merge the DOHMH restaurant data directly with 
the State’s finance data. We instead identified the subset of NAICS codes that appear among the 
graded establishments in DOHMH’s restaurant data and used these to identify the restaurants in 
NYC that should be subject to grading; these establishments are henceforth referred to as 
“graded” restaurants.14  We then use two comparison groups: (i) suburban establishments with 
similar NAICS codes as “graded” restaurants in NYC (henceforth referred to as ungraded 
restaurants) and (ii) ungraded food and entertainment establishments (with distinct NAICS codes 
than those subject to grading) unlikely to have been graded, in NYC and the suburban counties. 
See Appendix B for a detailed breakdown. Second, we grouped the tax filers by their reported 
county of operation and type of establishment (i.e. NAICS code), by quarter. Thus, we create a 
                                                          
13 It is important to note that the sales and tax data from NYC’s Department of Finance is 
originally sourced from the state data as well. Therefore, the underlying data is the same across 
the two samples; the meaningful difference is in how the individual filer data was grouped. 
14 This means that we are capturing the universe of food-service establishments that are very 
likely (but not definitively) subject to NYC’s grading regime. Therefore, we set up something 
akin to an intent-to-treat group rather than a clean treatment group. While this over-inclusion 
of “graded” establishments could attenuate our estimates, we mitigate against this by pulling 
an identical set of NAICS codes for the comparison establishments in the suburban counties and 
conducting a difference-in-difference estimation. In addition, we’ve replicated analyses using 
only the subset of NAICS codes that definitively apply to food service and restaurant 
establishments (those coded as 722---), which are certainly subject to grading. The results are 
substantively the same as those using the full sample of establishments; they are available from 
the authors upon request. 
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dataset where the level of observation is the group-quarter and each observation includes the 
means and standard deviations of sales. Our sample for the expanded NYC sales analyses includes 
1,525,330 group-quarter observations over a the 10-year sample period from 2007-2016. This 
includes over 800,000 observations of NYC restaurants that are “graded,” or most likely to be 
subject to the grading law based on their NAICS classification. 
V. Empirical Strategy 
 Our empirical strategy relies on a difference-in-difference specification, comparing 
establishments subject to the grading policy to those exempt from the policy, before and after 
the implementation of the policy. For some outcomes, we augment this specification to include 
two simultaneous control groups. Restaurants in NYC are continuously inspected (and scored) 
throughout the study period, but only after the start of the grading policy are the inspection 
results made conspicuous via the posted grade.15 Estimates of the policy effect, therefore, 
capture the impact of new information provided through the posted grade.  
A. Inspection Scores and Fines 
 We use inspection scores and fines to measure (i) food safety compliance behaviors, and 
(ii) fiscal burdens.16  Fines are also a good measure of the policy’s direct fiscal impact on the City, 
                                                          
15 We know that restaurants in Nassau and Westchester counties are inspected for food safety 
compliance and the results of these inspections are made available via 
https://health.data.ny.gov. 
16 We would also like to estimate changes in the likelihood of restaurant closures, but we are 
limited in how precisely we can identify the timing of closure. We identify restaurant closure as 
whether or not it is still operating at the time of inspection; since inspections occur irregularly, 
we are unable to precisely pinpoint the timing of closure, introducing considerable bias into our 
estimates. To address this issue, we would have to exclude all restaurants closing in the year 
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since the new grading regime imposes little or no new costs.17 We begin with a standard pre-
post model, as follows: 
(1) yit = β0 + Grading_Postit' β1 + Xi' β2 + β3Pre_Postit + γi + δt + εit 
Here, y reflects restaurant outcomes, including inspection scores and fines. Grading_Post is a set 
of three variables, which capture the implementation of the grading policy: Post, Post_trend and 
Post_trend2. Post takes on the value of 0 prior to the start of the grading policy (for t<0) and 1 
thereafter (for t>0); the coefficient on Post captures the initial effect of the policy’s 
implementation. Post_trend and Post_trend2 are created by interacting Post with linear and 
quadratic time trends, and allow the effect to change over time; X is a vector of restaurant 
characteristics including cuisine, service, and venue type; Pre_Post is a linear (and, in certain 
specifications, nonlinear) time trend; γ and δ are zip code and seasonal fixed effects, respectively; 
and ε is an error term. In an alternative model specification, we estimate model (1) controlling 
for restaurant fixed effects, μi, instead of γi and Xi.  
 When grading started, restaurants were not uniformly exposed to the new inspection 
regime (i.e. did not have to post a grade until they had a graded inspection following the policy 
change). We exploit the variation in grade posting during the roll-out period in an alternative 
specification, where we limit the sample to restaurant-quarter observations during the first year 
of the policy’s legislative start, or the roll-out period. Here we are comparing the “early posters” 
to the “late posters” and this model takes on the following form: 
(2) yit = β0 + β1Post_Rolloutit+ X’iβ2 + γi + δt + εit 
                                                          
during which the policy is implemented (approximately 20% of our sample) or during the last 
year of the panel (approximately 20% of our sample).   
17 This is a reasonable assumption that is corroborated by accounts from DOHMH. 
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Again, y is a restaurant-specific outcome (inspection scores and fines) and Post_Rollout takes on 
the value of 1 if the restaurant has posted a grade placard by the beginning of the quarter t and 
0 otherwise. The remaining variables are identical to those defined above. 
B. Sales Revenues 
 As described above, we compare “graded” NYC restaurants to ungraded restaurants in 
the suburban counties and to ungraded food and entertainment establishments in NYC and the 
suburban counties.18  We include this third group of establishments, which are never subject to 
grading, in order to capture sector-specific trends. Therefore, we end up with the intent-to-treat 
group (“graded” restaurants in NYC) and two counterfactuals (ungraded restaurants in the 
suburban counties and ungraded food establishments and entertainment venues). We set up a 
triple difference-in-difference model, using the grouped sales data. The fully-specified model is 
as follows: 
(3) 𝑦𝑔𝑞 = 𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈_𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒈𝒒′𝝉𝟏 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒈𝒒′𝝉𝟐 + 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒕_𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒈𝒒′𝝉𝟑 +
𝜏4𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑞 +  𝛾𝑐𝑟 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝑔𝑞 
Here, 𝑦𝑔𝑞 is the group’s average restaurant sales in quarter q. As above, Grading_Post a set of 
three variables, Post, Post_trend, and Post_trend2. As above, Post takes on the value of 1 if 
quarter q is after the start of the grading policy and 0 otherwise; Post_trend and Post_trend2 are 
interactions between Post and linear and quadratic time trends, respectively. We add to this 
model a vector, Restaurant, to control for the degree to which establishments are subject to the 
NYC grading policy (i.e. NYC “graded” restaurants vs. suburban ungraded restaurants vs. 
                                                          
18 Again, a table with the assignment of NAICS codes for grade-able restaurants and ungraded 
food establishments and entertainment venues is presented in Appendix B. 
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ungraded food and entertainment establishments, the latter of which is omitted as the reference 
category). These variables will also help to control for reputational differences across the 
different types of establishments. We also include interaction terms, included in Rest_Grading, 
whose coefficients capture the post-grading effect on “graded” NYC restaurants and suburban 
restaurants relative to ungraded food and entertainment establishments. Therefore, 𝝉𝟑 identifies 
the effect from any new information provided by the posted grades, above-and-beyond the 
influence of sector, geography or pre-grading reputation. Finally, 𝛾𝑐𝑟 and δq are county-NAICS 
and quarter fixed effects, respectively.19  We note that while point estimates are of the mean 
impact on restaurants, the standard errors are larger than if we observed individual restaurant 
sales. We also cluster the standard errors by county-NAICS to mitigate spatial autocorrelation 
across proximate establishments.20  
 And as above, we also specify an alternative, roll-out model, exploiting the detailed panel 
data on sales revenues for NYC graded restaurants alone:  
(4) 𝑦𝑔𝑞 = 𝜏1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑔𝑞 + 𝑿′𝒈𝒒𝝉𝟐 + 𝛾𝑔 + 𝛿𝑞 + 𝑔𝑞 
Where 𝑦𝑔𝑞is the group’s mean sales in quarter q and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 is the average share of days 
in quarter q of posting a grade placard for restaurants in group g. As above, grade placards can 
                                                          
19 Specifically, we group observations (and cluster their standard errors) by two-, three- and 
four-digit NAICS codes: in case of restaurants (graded and ungraded) we group those coded 
772--- and 445--- separately; in the case of ungraded food/entertainment establishments we 
group 71----, 4451--, 4452-- and 4453—separately. These groupings are consistent with how the 
sales data were processed and grouped. We do replicate these models with less restrictive 
geographic controls and the results are substantively the same. The finer spatial controls will 
also help in minimizing the effect of reputation on the grading estimates, since consumers are 
more likely to be exposed to similar reputational information in closer spatial proximity (Jin and 
Leslie 2009).  
20 We are less concerned about geographic co-dependence of the inspections themselves, since 
inspectors are randomly assigned to restaurants and not on a geographic basis. 
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read A, B, C, or Grade Pending, because treatment begins with the first grades assigned at 
inspection. Insofar as Grade Pending is an unclear signal to consumers, sales results will be 
attenuated to zero. Again, these estimates are consistent -- but inefficient -- as compared to 
estimates derived from models run on restaurant-level observations, as described earlier. The 
remaining variables are identical to those defined above for the inspection score and fines 
models, but aggregated to the group level. 
VI. Results 
A. Inspection Scores 
 We first discuss results from the pre-post analysis, estimating the grading policy’s impact 
on the restaurant’s food safety compliance, as measured by inspection scores from 2007-2013. 
Table 2 shows initial inspection score results, which provide the strictest test of improved food 
safety compliance. Table 3 shows final inspection score results, which test the extent to which 
further compliance improvement occurs after poor initial inspection performance.  
 The first column of Table 2 shows that after the implementation of the grading policy, 
initial inspection scores decline (i.e. health conditions improve) by about 1.3 points on average 
per inspection. This is about 6% percent of the sample mean in the pre-period. When we include 
additional controls, such as seasonal and ZIP fixed effects, restaurant characteristics and a pre-
post trend line, the coefficient on Post turns positive and decreases slightly in magnitude, 
suggesting that compliance improves over time, but does not improve precisely at the time of 
policy implementation. The coefficient on Post remains positive and significant when we include 
restaurant fixed effects (instead of ZIP fixed effects and time-invariant restaurant characteristics) 
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and then when we include a linear Post_trend. The results from this model indicate that upon 
policy implementation initial inspection scores go up by about 1.2 points, but decline over time 
by about .33 per quarter, implying that mean initial inspection scores improve starting about one 
year after policy implementation. When we add in Post_trend2 in the final column, the magnitude 
of the post-grading effect increases to 2.4 and the ensuing change is clearly nonlinear: after the 
initial bump up in scores, there is a decline of about 1.5 points per quarter that flattens out over 
time. In sum, while the initial effect of the grading policy indicates less compliance, the slope 
effect over time indicates that compliance has improved since public grading began. On net, the 
overall effect is improved compliance within the first two quarters of implementation that also 
continues through the end of the sample period. In general, we note that the other covariates 
display generally expected signs: initial inspection scores are lower (better) for chains and 
uncorrelated with number of seats and number of workers. There is also variation in scores 
depending on cuisine. 
 Table 3 shows the same models, using final inspection scores. Just as above, the first 
column displays a significant and negative coefficient on Post, but much larger in magnitude: final 
inspection scores decline by about 7.6 points on average. As we add in controls to the model, the 
coefficient on Post remains negative and decreases slightly in magnitude, and in the final, 
preferred models, inspection scores decline by about 4 points on average upon implementation 
of the grading policy. When we include only the linear Post_trend, scores continue to decline 
over time, at about .29 per quarter. The final column includes a nonlinear Post_trend2, and there 
is, again, evidence of a nonlinear response over time: initially, scores go down by 5 and continue 
to decline (at 1.1 points per quarter), but at a declining rate. Since final inspection scores reflect 
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food safety conditions after feedback or general learning from initial inspections, it is not 
surprising that the immediate effect (i.e. the coefficient on Post) is a reduction in scores. Both 
initial and final scores decline over time (but at a decreasing rate) after policy implementation, 
suggesting improved food safety compliance and ongoing learning on the part of restaurants 
during the first six months of the policy. In general, we note that the other covariates display 
generally expected signs: final inspection scores are lower (better) for chains and uncorrelated 
with the number of workers and number of seats. There is also variation in scores depending on 
cuisine and the directions of those relationships are generally consistent with the relationships 
observed in the results for initial inspection scores.  
 As an alternative specification, we exploit the policy’s roll-out period to identify the 
impact of posting a grade on inspection scores. One concern with this approach is that the 
restaurants exposed earlier to the policy were systematically different than those exposed later. 
We assess the differences in early- and late-graded restaurants across a range of observed 
restaurant characteristics and sanitary conditions—displayed in Appendix C. In general, we find 
no meaningful difference between the early- and late-inspections, and fail to reject the null of 
group equivalence in a joint-significance F-test.21  This mitigates some concerns of selection bias, 
based on observed characteristics (which we assume are at least somewhat correlated with 
unobserved characteristics), and we proceed with the assumption that the roll-out of the 
program was random, conditional on the restaurants’ observed characteristics. We also control 
for restaurant-level characteristics in the regression models and, in some specifications, 
                                                          
21 We also find little or no difference between the sample for the roll-out analysis and the larger 
sample for the pre-post analysis. 
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restaurant fixed effects for a within-restaurant comparison over time, further reducing 
unobserved heterogeneity across early- and late-graded restaurants.  
 The results for the roll-out regression analysis are displayed in Table 4, and we begin with 
the most parsimonious model, controlling for restaurant characteristics and time trends. We 
show results for both initial and final inspection score results.  Both initial and final scores go 
down, although the declines are bigger for the latter measure, which is consistent with the results 
from the pre-post sample. Again, this is likely due to some combination of restaurant learning 
and improved compliance over somewhat shorter re-inspection windows. In the models with 
restaurant fixed effects, initial inspection scores for restaurants exposed to the grading policy 
(compared to those not yet exposed) go down by just under 1 point. Similarly, final inspection 
scores decline almost 4 points per inspection. We recognize that there could be a period of 
adjustment, even during the roll-out period. To test for this, we replicate the roll-out analysis, 
allowing the effect of the graded inspection to vary across time. These results are displayed in 
Appendix D. The immediate effect of the graded inspection is positive for initial inspections and 
negative for final ones; over the course of the roll-out period, this effect progressively becomes 
more negative (i.e. scores are improving). Thus, by the end of the first year of the grading policy, 
mean initial and final inspection scores are both lower than they were before public grading. 
Again, this is consistent with the findings from the pre-post analysis.  
 Altogether, the results for inspection scores indicate a period of adjustment on the part 
of the restaurants, which initially see a slight bump up in initial inspection scores and then a 
steady decline over time. The initial increase in scores could mean two things. First, it suggests 
that restaurants were changing their food safety compliance behaviors in response to the policy 
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(and the feedback from the inspections), but that it took time for it to manifest itself in the actual 
restaurants’ conditions. The initial scores (and therefore food safety conditions) could have been 
more reflective of restaurants’ conditions prior to the start of the grade-posting policy, and later 
inspection scores a product of their response to the change in policy. This pattern is supported 
by the descriptive statistics displayed in Table 5, which also show an improvement (i.e. decline) 
in inspection scores as the program progressed. During the period before public grading, 
restaurants earned inspection scores of 24.6 on average. In the first five quarters after public 
grading, mean final inspection scores improved to 18.2. This initial improvement was driven by 
improved compliance during re-inspections, as the initial scores are about level with the pre-
implementation scores. In the next five quarters, average final inspection scores further 
improved to 15.6. This second improvement was driven in part by improved compliance on initial 
inspections (which on average went down to 22.2).22  
 A second explanation for initially increasing and then declining scores relates to inspector 
behavior—that they had incentives to improve scores under the new grading regime regardless 
of actual food safety compliance. While we cannot test this directly, there are three reasons we 
think this mechanism is unlikely (and that any improvement in scores predominantly reflects an 
improvement in food safety compliance). First, inspectors are randomly assigned to their site 
visits, and therefore restaurants are dealing with different individuals for the initial and re-
inspections—it is unlikely that the randomly assigned inspector for re-inspection would be 
colluding with the initial inspector to systematically reduce final inspection scores, other than 
                                                          
22 We find similar changes in mean inspection scores for “continuously operating” restaurants 
that operate for two and half years before and two and half years after public grading. 
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based on an observed improvement in food safety compliance. Second, conversations with food 
safety practice and epidemiological experts at the DOHMH confirm that the same inspection 
procedures, rubrics and trainings were used before and after the policy and that inspectors were 
trained to maintain the same standards.23 Third, the similar distribution of initial scores, before 
and after grading, suggests that any inspector-driven grade inflation was, at worst, minimal.  
B. Fines 
 Next we consider how the grading policy affects fines; this is one potential financial 
benefit for the City (and conversely, a financial burden for restaurants). Some claimed that the 
policy was an excuse for the City to collect more revenues from inspected establishments; we 
test the validity of this claim here. To start, we consider Figure 2, which shows mean restaurant 
fines by quarter. While fines per restaurant increase in the year immediately following program 
implementation, this extends a pre-existing trend (that temporarily discontinues in the second 
quarter of 2011, during program implementation). Quarterly fines reach a peak of $675 per 
operating restaurant in the first quarter of 2012 and then decline steadily, reaching pre-program 
levels by the third quarter of 2013 ($353 in fines for the average restaurant). The question is 
                                                          
23 We recognize that there is selection into which restaurants are re-inspected. The re-
inspected restaurants get a second draw from the score distribution, which mechanically leads 
to score “inflation.” This is not inspectors’ score inflation, but rather the design of the program 
(and should still reflect food safety improvement). The new policy did include the hiring of more 
inspectors, but there is no evidence to suggest that the new inspectors were more lenient than 
the older ones; and again, they were still being randomly assigned to inspections. In addition, 
while the higher stakes of the posted grades could change the nature of the interaction 
between inspectors and restaurants, it is unlikely that this shift would be so systematic as to 
drive the effects we observe. 
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whether the post-grading trend is significantly different than what would have continued 
otherwise. 
 Starting with a simple pre-post model in the first column of Table 6, we see that fines 
declined after the policy’s implementation. The coefficient on Post is negative and highly 
significant and indicates that on average fines went down by $271 per inspection. When we add 
in restaurant controls, a linear time trend, and ZIP and seasonal fixed effects, the magnitude on 
the Post coefficient goes down substantially, but still remains negative: fines reduced by about 
$62 per inspection after the grading policy’s implementation. When we instead rely on restaurant 
fixed effects, the coefficient on Post flips its sign to positive, suggesting that fines decline over 
time, but the decline does not coincide with the precise timing of the policy change. In the final 
columns of Table 6, our preferred models show that upon policy implementation, fines increase 
(by about $65 or $110 per inspection, depending on whether or not a nonlinear post-trend is 
included), but they decline precipitously (and linearly) over time, such that by the second quarter 
after implementation any increase in fines had been reversed. This immediate increase in fines 
is consistent with the short-term increase in initial inspection scores, which also goes down over 
the first year of the policy. Again, this suggests learning and adjustments on the part of 
restaurants. Altogether, these results suggest that the grading policy did not increase fine-driven 
revenues for the City, which initially increase but drop during the first six months and end up 
lower than before the policy change. 
 Again, we repeat the analysis using the roll-out sample, comparing those restaurants that 
were exposed to the grading regime earlier in the rollout period to those that were exposed later. 
The first column of Table 7 displays the results for the model without restaurant fixed effects; 
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those restaurants exposed earlier to the grading regime pay higher fines on average than those 
exposed later—about $44 more per inspection. We then add in restaurant fixed effects so that 
we can compare fines within restaurants, and the magnitude of the coefficient on Post_Rollout 
goes down and flips to a negative sign. Therefore, in our preferred model, we estimate fines 
decline $31 per quarter during the first year of the policy. This decline is consistent with that 
observed in the larger pre-post sample, which also produced fine declines over the course of the 
initial year. 
C. Falsification Tests for Inspection Score and Fines 
 For the pre-post analyses on inspection scores and fines, we implement a placebo test to 
assess the timing of level and slope changes relative to the grading policy’s implementation. To 
do this, we replicate the estimation, assigning a placebo policy start date one year prior to the 
actual policy start date. We find that the program was already being discussed in the popular 
press one year prior to the program’s actual start, and so we use this date. The results from this 
analysis are displayed in Table 8.24 
 In the case of initial and final scores, we see that the false start date is associated with an 
immediate decline in scores (which is statistically insignificant for final scores), but a large 
increase in the three quarters thereafter. Thus, inspection scores are actually worse overall in the 
period immediately preceding policy implementation than would be detected with a simple 
                                                          
24 We run more parsimonious models, including only Post_false and Post_trend_false, but for 
purposes of brevity we display only the more comprehensive models since they better control 
for all the possible points of inflection during the pre- and post-grading regimes. We further 
specify models with quadratic and cubic time trends, finding similar results, which are available 
upon request of the authors. 
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linear trend-line. The true policy start date (while still controlling for the false start date) is 
associated with statistically significant declines for both initial and final scores (the latter one 
about ten times larger), and then a continued decline over the post-period. The discontinuity in 
intercept and reversal in slope both suggest that any decline in inspection scores is in fact 
associated with the grade posting and not a continuation of a prior trend or expectation.  
 For fines, we conduct the same test and see that the false start date is associated with an 
increase in fines and a positive slope thereafter. The actual policy start date, however, indicates 
a drop in fines and a subsequent decline (that rather quickly reverses any prior increase in fines). 
Again, this reversal suggests that any initial bump up in fines (as observed in the pre-post analysis) 
could be driven by trends prior to the actual start date, and that the grading policy itself is 
associated with a drop in fines. 
D. Sales Revenues 
 We now turn to our broader sample, which includes NYC, Westchester and Nassau 
counties for 2007-2016. Again, as a starting point, we look at unadjusted trends over the course 
of the study period. Figure 3 shows mean sales by quarter for the 14 quarters before public 
grading and the 26 quarters after, stratified by exposure to grading and location. We see that 
mean sales follow parallel trends for “graded” NYC restaurants and ungraded suburban 
restaurants before the implementation of the grading policy in mid-2010; there is, however, a 
slight divergence immediately after the policy starts, and then a re-convergence in the second 
half of 2014. We also note that mean sales for suburban ungraded food and entertainment 
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establishments exhibit more volatility than those for the restaurants, and are consistently higher 
than those for similarly classified establishments in NYC.  
 To test the extent to which this trend persists in the presence of restaurant, geographic 
and temporal controls, we consider the regression results in Tables 9 and 10, which display the 
results for the pre-post and difference-in-difference models. The first column of Table 9 shows a 
simple pre-post model, on only the sample of the NYC food establishments subject to the grading 
policy (the “graded restaurants”). Controlling only for county and seasonal variation, we see that, 
after the policy started, restaurants witnessed an increase in sales revenues of nearly $10,000.25  
Without a control group of ungraded establishments, it is unclear whether or not this increase in 
revenues is due to the new grading regime or to trends that would have continued even in the 
absence of the policy. Therefore, in the second column, we add in a control group of ungraded 
establishments (including food and entertainment services, still in NYC only) and estimate a 
difference-in-difference. The coefficient on Restaurant_Grading is our impact estimate of 
interest, and it is negative and statistically insignificant. Compared to food and entertainment 
establishments that were not subject to grading, “graded” restaurants saw no significant change 
in revenues after the policy’s implementation. We also note that the coefficient on Restaurant is 
positive and significant (albeit marginally), which captures, at least in part, pre-grading 
differences (between “graded” restaurants and ungraded establishments in NYC). 
                                                          
25 This finding is consistent with what we find when running a similar model on the panel of 
grouped NYC restaurants. For that sample, we find that revenues increase between $8,000 and 
$10,700, depending on the specification. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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 One concern with the current difference-in-difference estimate is that we do not have 
the right counterfactual, since the ungraded food and entertainment establishments could be 
subject to different macroeconomic trends than those for the “graded” restaurants. In addition, 
the estimates of Restaurant_Grading could be biased by cross-contamination of the grading 
effect onto un-graded establishments. Specifically, the posted grades on certain establishments 
could shift consumers’ general assessment and internalization of hygiene for all kinds of food and 
entertainment establishments. Therefore, we expand our sample to include counties bordering 
NYC that were not exposed to any grading regime, but were arguably subject to similar regional 
trends and shocks.  
 In the final column of Table 9, we use the sample including NYC and bordering suburban 
counties, but retain only restaurants. This model compares revenue outcomes for NYC “graded” 
restaurants against those for ungraded restaurants in Nassau and Westchester counties. While 
the coefficient on Restaurant_Grading turns positive, it remains insignificant. Altogether, these 
findings suggest two things: first, the selection of the control group matters (as indicated by the 
change in signs), and, second, compared to a range of reasonably similar establishments, the 
graded restaurants did not experience any significant revenue changes after the implementation 
of the grading policy. 
 For the next set of results (displayed in Table 10), we include a second counterfactual. We 
specify the model as a triple difference-in-difference, where graded NYC restaurants are 
compared to both similarly classified ungraded restaurants in Westchester and Nassau counties 
and to ungraded food and entertainment establishments in the NYC and suburban counties. We 
start with a model that is otherwise similarly specified as the one for the NYC difference-in-
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difference. The new variables of interest are NYC_Rest_Graded and Suburb_Rest_Graded, and 
their coefficients capture the effect of the grading policy on revenues, relative to ungraded food 
and entertainment establishments. In the first column, the change in revenues for graded 
restaurants in NYC is not statistically different from that for ungraded food and entertainment 
establishments (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on NYC_Rest_Graded); a t-test 
against the coefficient on  Suburb_Rest_Graded indicates that their difference is not statistically 
significant either. In the second column of Table 10 we add in county-specific time trends and 
control for a linear trend in revenues (both before and after the implementation of the grading 
regime). First, we see that the magnitudes on the NYC_Rest_Graded and Suburb_Rest_Graded 
coefficients increase substantially, suggesting that there is county-specific variation over time 
that was pushing those estimates down. Second, the post-grading effect on NYC restaurants is 
still positive and insignificant (relative to the ungraded food and entertainment establishments). 
Finally, the coefficient on NYC_Rest_Graded is statistically different than that on 
Suburb_Rest_Graded, suggesting that, on average, “graded” restaurants in NYC experienced a 
relatively smaller increase in revenues compared to similarly classified restaurants in the 
suburban counties that were not subject to grading. The fact that this difference is significant, 
while the difference with ungraded food and entertainment establishments is not, adds credence 
to a grading-induced suppression of sales. Moreover, this suppression is substantively 
meaningful at about $16,500, or 8-10% of the typical restaurant’s revenues in the sample.  
 We now turn to a second set of estimates, NYC_Rest_Posttrend and 
Suburb_Rest_Posttrend, which allow the grading effect to vary linearly over time. While NYC 
“graded” restaurants see a significant increase in revenues over time relative to non-food 
 
31 
 
entertainment establishments, there is no significant difference in the post-trends between NYC 
and Suburban restaurants; this suggests that, when we assume a linear trend for the six years 
after the implementation of the grading policy, the initial difference in revenues is sustained.26  
 Finally, we estimate the impact using a model that allows the post-grading effect to vary 
non-linearly over time (displayed in the third column of Table 10). A number of the findings 
change. First, the magnitude of the effect declines substantially for “graded” NYC restaurants 
relative to ungraded suburban restaurants (to about $2,000). Second, and more importantly, this 
difference is no longer statistically significant (although the difference, relative to ungraded food 
and entertainment establishments, becomes significant). In addition, while there is no statistical 
difference in the linear post-grading trends for sales, the nonlinear post-trend for the “graded” 
NYC restaurants is significantly different from that for the ungraded suburban restaurants. Both 
linear trends flatten out over time (more so for suburban restaurant sales), which results in the 
convergence of sales that was initially evident in Figure 3. Therefore, any immediate response in 
revenues is muted when we account for nonlinear revenue adjustments over the longer term.27 
 We test for the robustness of these findings in two ways. First, in order to narrow the 
comparison space, we restrict the sample to the counties in NYC that are adjacent to the 
suburban counties. It is conceivable that micro-regional shocks to the consumption or operation 
                                                          
26 We check whether or not our estimates are influenced by a change in the composition of 
establishments over time (and specifically a higher likelihood of closure among “graded” NYC 
restaurants), and we see no evidence of this in the data. In fact, we see a slightly higher growth 
in establishments in the “graded” NYC group. See Appendix E for a visual. 
27 This finding is consistent with reports from officials at DOHMH, who observe an increasing 
number of “A” grades over time, such that the value-added of the posted food safety 
information could disappear over time.  
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of restaurants could still bias the estimates, and this specification will better control for such a 
threat. In addition, it is plausible that the spatially proximate communities on either side of the 
NYC border are more similar. These results are displayed in the final column of Table 10.  The 
results are consistent with those from the full sample: while revenues grow across the board, the 
increase is relatively smaller for “graded” NYC restaurants compared to ungraded suburban 
restaurants. The magnitude of the difference is smaller, about $9,250 (about 10 percent of the 
mean sales for restaurants in the sample), but remains statistically significant in the presence of 
non-linear trends.28  This finding suggests that consumers could be sorting away from the graded 
restaurants in NYC to those across the border in Nassau and Westchester counties (restaurants 
across the border could also be adjusting their behavior to signal better hygiene); for the citywide 
sample, consumers could also be sorting away from lower graded restaurants to higher graded 
ones within NYC, which would result in the neutral fiscal effect that we observe.  
 Second, we estimate a roll-out model on the panel of NYC-only restaurants; these results 
are displayed in Table 11. In the fully specified model (i.e. with group fixed effects), the coefficient 
on Post is negative and statistically insignificant. These results suggest that within the first year 
of the program, there was no significant revenue effect on those exposed earlier to the grading 
regime compared to those exposed later.29  However, the sign on the grading impact coefficient 
                                                          
28 One might also expect some cross-border contamination, if consumers are now internalizing 
restaurant food safety signals differently or if ungraded restaurants in the suburban counties 
change their behaviors to respond to an increased awareness around food safety. We exclude the 
NYC counties that are geographically proximate to the suburban counties (retaining only 
Manhattan, Brooklyn and Staten Island in the NYC sub-sample) and re-run identical 
specifications. The results remain substantively the same.  
29 We also tested for differential revenue effects across the roll-out period, but none of these 
results were statistically significant. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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is negative, which is consistent with the findings from the triple difference-in-difference models 
where the increase in revenues for graded NYC restaurants was smaller than that for ungraded 
suburban restaurants. The lack of significance for this estimate can be explained in two ways. 
First, it is possible that we lose power, and therefore precision, in our reduced-sample estimation. 
Second, it could also reflect a lack of clear information to consumers in the first months of the 
policy. Among early exposed restaurants, only those earning A’s posted grades in the first couple 
of months post-grading (due to timing of grade posting requirements in the inspection cycle). 
The time between initial inspection and re-inspection is 2 to 4 weeks and between re-inspection 
and adjudication, between 4 to 6 weeks; treated restaurants could post nothing during the first 
window and Grade Pending during the second window if they did not earn an A initially. It is not 
clear whether or not this distinction was meaningful enough to influence dining choices, and 
therefore revenues, during the initial months of the policy.  
VII. Conclusion 
 Cities have long inspected restaurants for their sanitary conditions, but the public 
disclosure of that information for consumers to incorporate into dining decisions is a relatively 
new phenomenon. The motivation for a restaurant grading policy is to make the sanitary 
conditions of a establishment more transparent and easily understood as a means of reducing 
the incidence of foodborne illnesses. Therefore, it is very much a health policy. However, if theory 
is correct, and consumers use this information to change their behaviors, restaurants (and the 
municipal fisc) could bear economic repercussions as well.  
 We systematically test these predictions using a collection of rich data on restaurants’ 
food safety compliance and sales activities in NYC and neighboring counties, both before and 
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after the implementation of NYC’s grading policy. Our results suggest that NYC’s restaurant 
grading policy, after an initial adjustment period, improves sanitary conditions (as measured by 
inspection scores) and reduces public revenues collected through fines.  
 The impact on sales revenues, however, is more nuanced. For restaurants in NYC overall, 
revenues go up following the policy (as they do for other kinds of establishments), but to a lesser 
degree than restaurants not subject to a grading regime. This suppressed revenue growth, 
however, goes away once we account for nonlinear trends in revenues over time. Furthermore, 
models that estimate effects during the policy’s roll-out year show no significant revenue change 
for restaurants that are first exposed to the grading regime, compared to those that are later 
exposed (although the sign of the effect still does indicate smaller revenues). Finally, when we 
restrict the sample to only those NYC counties that border the suburban counties, the relatively 
slower growth in revenues for NYC “graded” restaurants (compared to ungraded restaurants 
outside of the city) is both statistically and financially meaningful. This suggests that consumers 
are perhaps substituting away from the graded restaurants towards those without grades, 
favoring lack of information on food safety over explicit information on poor hygiene. 
Restaurants in the ungraded regime might be adjusting their practices as well, to signal better 
food safety. While not significant, the signs and magnitudes of the trends over time echo those 
from the full-sample analysis, suggesting a similar convergence in revenues in these border 
counties. 
 The health goals, as they relate to the restaurant’s food safety compliance, do seem to be 
addressed through the improvement of inspection scores. And the fiscal effects are neutral for 
the city overall, neither improving nor depressing restaurants’ revenues (and the taxes they in 
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turn generate). In addition, violation fines decline. However, these outcomes were not achieved 
immediately; the results consistently show that there is a period of adjustment, but one that does 
not last longer than six months. This makes sense, as consumers need to internalize the new 
information provided by the grades and the businesses need to then respond in their operations. 
Further, while a reduction in fines can be a boon to businesses (assuming their compliance costs 
do not exceed the savings in fines), it constitutes a revenue reduction for the City. According to 
our preferred estimates (and using the more conservative number of initial inspections only), this 
fiscal loss amounts to about $1.2 million for a typical fiscal quarter for the municipality, in 
addition to any increased administrative costs for running the program (which are estimated to 
be somewhere between $245 and $320 per inspection, averaging approximately $2.3 million in 
total annually to the City30). The magnitude of these costs relative to the potential benefits, 
however, is not entirely obvious without considering the potential health care savings from 
reduced incidences of foodborne illnesses.  
 Apart from the City’s overall welfare, we should also be concerned about the 
distributional effects of such a policy. While the current analysis obscures any variation across 
restaurants over time, related papers (using NYC and Los Angeles data) find that there are 
meaningful differences in economic performance across restaurants with different grades: 
restaurants that post As are less likely to close, owe fewer fines and bring in more revenues 
                                                          
30 The average cost per inspection is calculated by dividing all spending in DOHMH’s Food Safety 
budget by the reported number of actual restaurant inspections. Budget figures come from 
OMB Budget Function Analysis, and actual inspections come from DOHMH reporting to OMB. 
One reason costs may rise is that the City had to hire and train additional inspectors to 
implement increased use of reinspections. 
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compared to B restaurants (Schwartz et. al. 2015; Jin and Leslie 2003). Therefore, the relative 
benefits and burdens of the policy differ across restaurants. Certain restaurants may be able to 
more easily absorb the costs of managing higher stakes inspections and will likely benefit more 
from improved compliance. Likewise, depending on how these restaurants cluster across space, 
neighborhoods within cities could be differentially affected by the policy. Our border analysis 
suggests that this indeed could be the case.  
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Table 1. Restaurant Descriptive Statistics, New York City Sample 
 
Pre-Public 
Grading 
Post-Public 
Grading 
Number   
   Inspections 3.3 6.2 
   Final Inspections 3.3 3.2 
   Workers 6.5 6.7 
   Seats 29.6 29.5 
   
Cuisine   
   American 0.22 0.24 
   Chinese 0.09 0.11 
   Pizza 0.04 0.06 
   Latin 0.04 0.04 
   Café/Coffee/Tea 0.03 0.04 
   Others 0.38 0.51 
   Missing 0.20 0.00 
 1.00 1.00 
Service   
   Takeout-Limited Eat in 0.35 0.39 
   Wait Service 0.15 0.18 
   Wait and Counter 
Service 
0.11 0.17 
   Takeout Only 0.08 0.08 
   Counter Service 0.07 0.12 
   Others 0.06 0.07 
   Missing 0.20 0.00 
 1.00 1.00 
   
Chain 0.10 0.10 
   
Annual Closure Rate 0.16 0.12 
N 30,405 34,917 
Notes: Inspections include initial and re-inspections. Final inspections  
include all inspections in the pre-period, initial A inspections in the  
post-period, and re-inspections for those initially receiving B or C in the  
post-period. Workers, seats, cuisine, service, and chain reflect restaurant 
characteristics at the most recent restaurant inspection and are  
time-invariant variables. Annual closure rate is the fraction of open 
restaurants closing each year. 
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Table 2. Regression Results, Impact on Initial Inspection Scores, Pre-Post Estimation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Post -1.33*** 1.21*** 2.41*** 1.23*** 2.44*** 
 (0.09) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.34) 
Post*Linear Trend __ __ __ -0.33*** -1.46*** 
    (0.04) (0.14) 
Post*Linear Trend2     -.03* 
     (0.01) 
Linear Trend __ -0.22*** -0.28*** -0.10*** 0.55*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10) 
Linear Trend2     .07*** 
     (0.01) 
      
Seasonal FE N Y Y Y Y 
Rest. Char. N Y N N N 
Restaurant FE N N Y Y Y 
      
Constant 24.15*** 16.10*** 22.68*** 23.40*** 24.41*** 
 (0.07) (4.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) 
      
Inspections 159588  159588  116228  116228  116228  
Restaurants 41362  41362  20641  20641  20641  
R-squared 0.00  0.06  0.30  0.30  0.30  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Regression Results, Impact on Final Inspection Scores, Pre-Post Estimation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Post -7.62*** -5.08*** -4.25*** -4.05*** -4.94*** 
 (0.08) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.29) 
Post*Linear Trend __ __ __ -0.29*** -1.10*** 
    (0.03) (0.12) 
Post*Linear Trend2     -.07*** 
     (0.01) 
Linear Trend __ -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.05* .68*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) 
Linear Trend2     .08*** 
     (0.01) 
      
Seasonal FE N Y Y Y Y 
Rest. Char. N Y N N N 
Restaurant FE N N Y Y Y 
      
Constant 24.55*** 13.27*** 22.57*** 23.12*** 24.18*** 
 (0.07) (2.33) (0.12) (0.14) (0.19) 
      
Inspections 167,045 167,045 125,036 125,036 125,036 
Restaurants 40,554 40,554 20,634 20,634 20,633 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Scores, Rollout Estimation 
 Initial Inspection 
Score 
 
 Final Inspection Score 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Graded Inspection -3.553*** -0.949***  -3.382*** -3.778*** 
 (0.184) (0.159)  (0.181) (0.160) 
Quarter Of Grading Policy      
  2 0.696*** 0.379***  1.217*** 1.573*** 
 (0.054) (0.053)  (0.071) (0.070) 
  3 0.543*** -0.071  0.574*** 1.233*** 
 (0.091) (0.066)  (0.123) (0.093) 
  4 0.635*** 0.334***  0.756*** 2.051*** 
 (0.112) (0.073)  (0.150) (0.113) 
      
Restaurant FE N Y  N Y 
      
Constant 25.981*** 25.536***  20.219*** 19.791*** 
 (0.109) (0.059)  (0.099) (0.066) 
      
Observations 122,886 122,886  93,788 93,788 
R-squared 0.007 0.848  0.011 0.763 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Inspection Scores and Count of Inspections by Treatment Period, Pre-Post Sample 
  
Inspections: 
All Operating 
Restaurants 
Inspections: 
Continuously 
Operating 
Restaurants 
Pre 
 
25.07 
(76,231) 
23.50 
(29,804)     
Quarters 
Post 
   
1-5 Initial 25.31 
(41,933) 
24.26 
(17,723) 
 Final Inspection Score 21.87 
(27,874) 
20.88 
(11,743) 
6-10 Initial 22.46 
(46,180) 
21.62 
(18,409) 
 Final Inspection Score 19.52 
(29,135) 
18.78 
(11,544) 
Includes pre-adjudicated inspection scores. Mean score shown on top; number of inspections  
shown parenthetically. Final Inspection Score is the mean restaurant inspection score for final  
inspections each cycle (all A-graded initial inspections and re-inspections of restaurants that  
do not get an A grade on initial inspection). Continuously Operating Restaurants are open for  
every quarter of the sample period. 
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Table 6. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Fines, Pre-Post Estimation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Post -270.72*** -61.59*** 88.67*** 65.26*** 110.57*** 
 (5.77) (10.79) (10.54) (10.52) (16.51) 
Post*Linear Trend __ __ __ -55.98*** -131.17*** 
    (1.84) (7.01) 
Post*Linear Trend2     0.77  
     (0.67) 
Linear Trend __ -14.35*** -22.16*** 11.10*** 42.24*** 
  (0.87) (0.89) (1.45) -5 
Linear Trend2     3.34*** 
     (0.49) 
      
Seasonal FE N Y Y Y Y 
Rest. Char. N Y N N N 
Restaurant FE N N Y Y Y 
      
Constant 1,141.52*** 245.74* 947.74*** 1,081.79*** 1,132.0*** 
 (5.03) (137.72) (7.04) (8.44) (11.44) 
      
Inspections 233,642 233,642 172,098 172,098 172,098 
Restaurants 41,362 41,362 20,641 20,641 20,640 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.28 0.29 0.29 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7. Regression Results, Impact on Fines by Quarter, Rollout Estimation 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Graded Inspection 50.918*** -132.357*** 
 (10.547) (13.919) 
Quarter Of Grading Policy   
  2 95.591*** 163.405*** 
 (9.496) (10.108) 
  3 102.872*** 235.971*** 
 (12.863) (15.448) 
  4 99.762*** 279.118*** 
 (11.105) (15.132) 
   
Restaurant FE N Y 
   
Constant 358.596*** 333.149*** 
 (5.546) (5.741) 
   
Observations 94,752 94,752 
R-squared 0.003 0.551 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 8. Falsification Test, Inspection Scores, Fines, Revenues, and Sales Taxes, Pre-Post With 1 Year Lead 
VARIABLES Initial Score Final Score Fines 
    
Policy Start   
 
  Post -0.64** -6.76*** -138.92***  
(0.31) (0.27) (15.86) 
  Post*Linear Trend -1.38*** -1.27*** -98.96***  
(0.13) (0.12) (7.01) 
One Year Before   
 
  Post -0.76** -0.43 88.83***  
(0.38) (0.33) (20.04) 
  Post*Linear Trend 1.30*** 1.27*** 53.91***  
(0.14) (0.12) (7.37) 
Linear Trend -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.32  
(0.06) (0.05) (2.85) 
    
Seasonal FE Y Y Y 
Restaurant/Group 
FE 
Y Y Y 
    
Constant 23.15*** 22.59*** 989.98*** 
 (0.18) (0.15) (9.39) 
    
Inspections 109,197 120,261 159,617 
Restaurants 20,480 20,482 20,485 
Observations -- -- -- 
Rest-Quarters -- -- -- 
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 
Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 9. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Difference-in-Difference 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
   
 
Grading_Post 9,888.22* 11,466.94  6,324.63  
 (4855.19) (6658.48) (5824.01) 
Restaurant  56,691.90*  
  -27,931.33  
Rest_Grading  (2363.78) 3494.83  
  (7706.71) (7518.35) 
   
 
Seasonal FE Y Y Y 
County FE Y Y Y 
   
 
Constant 346,500.53*** 269,051.04*** 345,939.48*** 
 (21612.73) (48250.49) (21331.12) 
   
 
Observations 804,053 1,212,558 1,019,032 
R-squared 0.034 0.022 0.012 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by county-NAICS in parentheses. ***  
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 10. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Triple Difference-in-Difference 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grading_Post 1,323.71    
 (10427.72)    
Restaurant_NYC 48,765.38     
 (28799.77)    
Restaurant_Suburbs -36,580.01    
 (26055.05)    
NYC_Rest_Graded 10,337.39  21,983.01  17,385.42** 15,224.04** 
 (11294.69) (15931.95) (7110.68) (5194.44) 
Suburb_Rest_Graded 7631.83  38,453.69** 19,561.50*** 24,479.21*** 
 (11799.32) (15886.70) (3359.05) (4959.45) 
NYC_Rest_Post_trend  3,312.77** -1,367.26 -4,416.55 
  (1333.45) (5333.27) (9054.88) 
NYC_Rest_Post_trend2   -38.64 -315.33 
  
 (215.39) (343.78) 
Suburb_Rest_Post_trend  3452.09  4802.69  790.47  
  (2160.76) (4116.35) (5342.32) 
Suburb_Rest_Post_trend2   -589.92 -712.36 
  
 (395.07) (542.78) 
NYC_Post_trend  714.01  8439.84  6468.87  
  (1856.84) (7081.94) (7000.81) 
NYC_Post_trend2   -316.31 -277.33 
  
 (234.99) (232.54) 
NYC_Rest_Prepost_trend  -2,981.61** -319.55 3132.46  
  (1225.03) (4053.26) (6528.92) 
NYC_Rest_Prepost_trend2   134.92  388.66  
  
 (243.21) (433.32) 
Suburb_Rest_Prepost_trend  -1,658.54 2727.12  5306.53  
  (1646.23) (2755.09) (5701.21) 
Suburb_Rest_Prepost_trend2   308.08  483.36  
  
 (237.58) (434.71) 
Manhattan_Restaurant  113,435.91** 123,895.66**  
 
 (55067.07) (53081.06)  
Bronx_Restaurant  -149,372.11*** -138,909.01*** (24061.85) 
 
 (51053.85) (50013.71) (17127.22) 
Brooklyn_Restaurant  -145,897.73*** -135,430.95**  
 
 (50979.06) (49987.64)  
Queens_Restaurant  -121,880.45** -111,412.13** 3505.30  
 
 (50889.46) (49986.32) (14586.02) 
StatenIsland_Restaurant  -106,994.04** -96,525.94*  
 
 (51415.43) (50334.91)  
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VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nassau_Restaurant  -16,768.20 3,152.55  111,873.41*** 
 
 (50521.79) (49038.05) (13238.04) 
Westchester_Restaurant  -87,245.35* -67,317.25 41,401.11** 
 
 (51056.07) (49662.37) (15272.96) 
Bronx_Ungraded  -153,607.40*** -153,650.87*** -41,501.26*** 
 
 (49767.62) (49786.72) (11508.28) 
Brooklyn_Ungraded  -146,622.67*** -146,649.53***  
 
 (49482.83) (49497.41)  
Queens_Ungraded  -112,248.91** -112,264.42**  
 
 (50391.71) (50404.59)  
StatenIsland_Ungraded  -118,834.21** -118,814.04**  
 
 (49398.97) (49402.34)  
Nassau_Ungraded  49,691.02  65,340.53  170,850.48*** 
 
 (51234.38) (51776.35) (20752.49) 
Westchester_Ungraded  -6,561.37 9,078.67  114590.59  
  (78110.87) (81036.46) (66472.72) 
Seasonal FE Y N N N 
County FE Y N N N 
Quarter FE N Y Y Y 
County trend N Y Y Y 
     
Constant 276,225.43*** 207,073.21*** 186,436.26*** 79,800.24** 
 (49067.64) (55060.56) (57007.36) (27852.27) 
Observations 1,525,330 1,525,330 1,525,330 780,910 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.002 
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Table 11. Regression Results, Impact on Sales by Quarter, Food and Beverage Rollout Sample 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Graded Inspection 31,552.417 -4,485.497 
 (39,710.175) (6,686.311) 
Quarter Of Grading 
Policy 
  
2 -7,763.466 1,866.532 
 (10,710.803) (2,298.146) 
3 -26,199.939 -4,923.041 
 (23,558.118) (4,723.712) 
4 -16,070.555 11,821.031**
* 
 (31,101.395) (5,603.230) 
   
Group FE N Y 
   
Constant 212,102.946*
** 
212,970.365*
** 
 (5,506.497) (1,023.340) 
   
Observations 3800 3800 
Restaurant-Quarters 39,188 39,188 
R-squared 0.002 0.981 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by group in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of inspection scores 
Panel A. Final Score Distribution, Second Year of Grading 
 
 Panel B. Initial Inspection Score Distribution, Second Year of Grading 
 
 Panel C. Initial Inspection Score Distribution, Two Years Before Grading 
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Figure 2. Average Fines by Quarter, Operating Restaurants 
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Figure 3. Average Sales, By Graded and Ungraded Establishments 
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Appendix A. Sample Posted B Grade 
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Appendix B. NAICS Codes for Establishment Groupings 
"Graded" NYC Restaurants Ungraded Suburban Restaurants 
Ungraded Food and Entertainment 
Establishments 
NAICS Business/Service NAICS Business/Service NAICS Business/Service 
722--- 
Food Services and Drinking 
Places 722--- 
Food Services and 
Drinking Places 4451--* Grocery Stores 
445299 
All Other Specialty Food 
Stores 445299 
All Other Specialty Food 
Stores 4452--* Specialty Food Stores 
445291 Baked Goods Stores 445291 Baked Goods Stores 4453-- Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores 
445120 Convenience Stores 445120 Convenience Stores 7139-- 
Other Amusement and Recreation 
Industries 
     712--- 
Museums, Historical Sites, and Similar 
Institutions 
     711-- 
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and 
Related Industries 
            
  
*These exclude the NAICS codes included in the restaurant groups, i.e. 445299, 445291, 445120.  
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Appendix C. Mean Treatment and Control Group Characteristics, Rollout Sample By Quarter 
 Jun – Aug, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Sept – Nov, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Dec – Feb, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
Mar – May, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
Characteristics:         
  Borough         
Manhattan 39.6% 41.4% 40.3% 41.8% 41.5% 40.8% 41.6% 40.6% 
Bronx 9.4 9.8 10.2 9.4 10.0 9.0 9.6 9.3 
Brooklyn 24.8 22.8 23.2 22.6 22.9 22.6 22.9 22.0 
Queens 25.4 21.8 23.2 21.8 22.2 22.7 22.2 23.5 
Staten Island 0.9 4.2 3.1 4.4 3.4 4.9 3.7 4.5 
  Chain 15.6% 12.3% 13.6% 12.1% 13.8% 9.9% 13.5% 7.8% 
  Workers 5.9 7.3 6.8 7.5 7.0 7.5 7.2 6.6 
Building:         
  Assessed Value 7,322,578 9,503,942 9,108,455 9,557,440 9,151,351 9,293,507 9,061,502 10,200,000 
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 Jun – Aug, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Sept – Nov, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Dec – Feb, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
Mar – May, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
  Building Type 
 
 
 
     
 Office/Commercial 
9.2% 
7.2% 
8.0% 
6.9% 8.0% 5.6% 7.6% 4.7% 
  
Retail/Commercial 
34.7 
34.7 
35.5 
34.1 34.4 34.8 34.5 34.0 
 Mixed Retail 41.0 43.3 42.7 43.5 43.8 42.8 43.7 41.8 
 Other 
Commercial 
4.5 
4.5 
4.0 
4.8 4.1 5.4 4.3 6.4 
 Residential 9.0 8.2 7.9 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.2 8.7 
  
Government/Public 
1.6 
2.2 
1.9 
2.4 1.5 3.4 1.7 4.4 
Joint Significance F( 12, 937) =0.80 F( 12, 937) =1.08 F( 12, 937) =0.71 F( 11, 937) =1.39 
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 Jun – Aug, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Sept – Nov, 2010 
Treatment Control 
 
Dec – Feb, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
Mar – May, 2011 
Treatment Control 
 
Prob > F  = 0.6523 Prob > F = 0.3779 Prob > F =0.7279 Prob > F =0.1738 
  Initial Insp. Score 23.5 24.3 26.0 22.9 25.0 21.8 24.1 22.6 
  Final Insp. Score 18.0 20.1 20.9 19.2 20.5 18.3 19.9 18.8 
  Fines per Quarter $341 $250 $329 $202 $285 $175 $262 $170 
N 1,560 17,326 7,597 11,118 13,098 5,755 16,514 2,717 
N with Building 
Code 
1,082 12,122 5,364 7,817 9,333 4,000 11,742 1,858 
Notes: Restaurants in the treatment group have their first graded inspection by the end of the fiscal quarter. Control group 
restaurants do not have a graded inspection until after the quarter ends. Each observation is a restaurant-quarter. 
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Appendix D. Regression Results, Impact on Inspection Scores and Fines by Quarter, Rollout 
Sample 
VARIABLES Initial 
Inspection 
Final 
Inspection 
Fines 
    
Graded Inspection    
In Quarter 1: 1.897*** -2.137*** 153.759*** 
 (0.677) (0.379) (21.950) 
In Quarter 2: 0.810*** -2.377*** 26.014 
 (0.180) (0.177) (17.981) 
In Quarter 3:  -0.693*** -3.616*** -147.830*** 
 (0.170) (0.173) (20.183) 
In Quarter 4: -2.071*** -5.561*** -275.079*** 
 (0.182) (0.216) (18.357) 
    
Quarter Of Grading Policy    
  2 0.074 1.243*** 130.444*** 
 (0.052) (0.072) (10.915) 
  3 -0.133** 1.179*** 251.674***  
(0.063) (0.094) (19.331) 
  4 0.974*** 3.409*** 387.343***  
(0.076) (0.151) (17.798) 
    
Restaurant FE Y Y Y 
    
Constant 25.483*** 19.736*** 326.148*** 
 (0.059) (0.067) (6.021) 
    
Observations 122,886 93,451 94,752 
R-squared 0.849 0.764 0.553 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by restaurant in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Impact estimates of graded inspections on initial inspection 
scores, final inspection scores, and fines by quarter. Graded Inspection captures if 
the most recent inspection occurs after the restaurant grade program begins in July 
2010. Quarters Post * Graded is an interaction of the number of quarters after the 
grading policy is implemented and share of a quarter a restaurant has been treated. 
In Quarter 1, 2, 3, 4 are a vector of interactions between the quarter of observation 
and share of quarter with a graded inspection. Sample includes all restaurants 
continuously operating from the quarter before grading to five quarters following 
grading. 
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Appendix E. Composition of establishments, over time 
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